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IN THE UTAH COUKT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 970275-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THIS COURT MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING COURT'S 
ORAL RULING BECAUSE IT SUPPLEMENTS 
AND CLARIFIES THE WRITTEN FINDINGS 
Defendants argue repeatedly that this Court must strictly 
limit itself to the preliminary hearing court's written findings 
and order when it reviews the decision of the preliminary hearing 
court to dismiss the information against them (Br. of App. at 2-
3, 5, 10-11, 18-19, 20-21). In support of this argument, 
defendants rely on language from three cases, none of which fully 
represent the current state of the relevant law.1 See State v. 
1
 All three of these cases, examined in their factual 
contexts, stand for the single proposition that, where a trial 
court's oral comments made prior to a final ruling conflict with 
that ruling, the final ruling stands as the judgment of the 
court. There is nothing controversial about this principle, nor 
is there anything violative of it before the Court now. 
1 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 97b); Newton v. State Rd. Comm'n. 
463 P.2d 565 (Utah 1970); McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468 
(Utah 1952). 
In 1987, some nine years after the issuance of the most 
recent case cited by defendants, rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure was materially amended. In its current version, 
the rule "now explicitly authorizes [the reviewing court] to look 
beyond the written findings of fact to the trial record and 
evaluate the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings . . . 
rendered from the bench." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1058 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).2 Under 
current law, a reviewing court is "not confined to the contents 
of a particular document entitled ^Findings'; rather, the 
findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained in 
Rule 52(a) now provides in pertinent part: 
. . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. . . . It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence. . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This rule applies to criminal actions, 
pursuant to rule 26(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and rule 81(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1986). 
2 
other documents. . . ." Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 
App. 1989); accord Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah 
App. 1989)("Rule 52 does not mandate the entry of signed, written 
findings and conclusions. On the contrary, the court may even 
state its findings orally if it chooses")(emphasis omitted). In 
view of the underlying purpose of findings, which is to provide 
"a detailed and logical factual basis for the ultimate decision" 
for the parties themselves and for a reviewing court later called 
upon to examine the propriety of the decision, the amended rule 
52(a) makes good sense. Hansen. 736 P.2d at 1058. 
The case currently before the Court well illustrates the 
reason for a comprehensive approach to findings. Here, the 
preliminary hearing court heard the evidence and then orally 
announced its decision. After finding probable cause to believe 
that defendants had trespassed on state trust lands, the court 
stated, "I also find probable cause to believe that [defendants] 
did disturb these - or even disinterred these remains. . . . " 
(State's Opening Br. at addendum C or R. 109). The court 
followed this finding with an analysis of whether human remains 
were intended to fall within the ambit of the statute 
criminalizing abuse or desecration of a dead human body. See id. 
Towards the conclusion of its decision, the court reiterated its 
finding in context, stating: "I am not going to bind over on the 
felony charges, I will dismiss those charges and while indicating 
3 
as I have, my factual findings are that they did disinter these 
remains. And if that amounts to this offense, then this case 
should be sent back for trial. . . ." (R. 111). 
After the court completed its oral ruling, the following 
colloquy occurred: 
Court: [Defense counsel], it will be 
up to you and [co-counsel] to 
prepare an Order putting into 
- putting on paper the court's 
decision here. 
Defense 
Counsel: Any other findings, Judge, you 
said that your findings is 
[sic] that they did disinter? 
Court: Yes. 
(R. 112). 
The preliminary hearing court thus reiterated three times, 
including once in direct response to an explicit question posed 
by defense counsel, that it found probable cause to believe that 
defendants had disinterred remains. Notably, however, the 
document entitled "Findings and Order" does not contain any 
finding embodying the court's unequivocal ruling. Instead, the 
written findings drafted by defendants focus not on the 
determination of probable cause to believe defendants disinterred 
human remains at all, but rather on the peripheral distinction 
between regulation of private and public lands (findings #3, 7, 
8) and definitions of the terms "dead body" and "remains" 
(findings #4, 5, 6). The single finding that relates at all to 
4 
the clear substance of the preliminary hearing court's central 
ruling obliquely states: 
2. The state presented evidence that 
defendants, in the process of searching for 
archeological artifacts, disturbed human 
bones and bone fragments. The state has not 
shown that the bones were in their original 
place of repose before they were disturbed by 
defendants. 
State's Opening Br. at addendum B or R. 48.3 
Defendants now seek to confine this Court to the written 
ruling, arguing that the preliminary hearing court's oral finding 
of probable cause is inconsistent with its written findings and 
should, therefore, be ignored (Br. of App. at 2, 5, 11, 19). 
Defendants' argument fails at the outset because it is based on a 
faulty premise. 
The oral ruling is not inconsistent with the written 
finding. Rather, it provides a necessary explanation for a vague 
and incomplete written finding, drafted without the precise 
language repeatedly articulated and specifically ordered by the 
Defendants make much of the second sentence of this 
finding, although the original place of repose was never even 
discussed at the preliminary hearing. As to defendants' 
contention that "there is no hint that bone fragments in the 
instant case were ever buried," the evidence is to the contrary 
(Br. of App. at 18. Indeed, evidence adduced at the preliminary 
hearing included testimony that the digging was "very recent," 
that the bones appeared to have been dug "within a couple of 
days," and that they were found "in close proximity to recently-
screened dirt" (R. 87, 101, 103). A fair inference, properly 
made based on record evidence, is that they came from the hole, 
where they were buried. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
(Utah 1995). 
5 
finder of iacu. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelv 
Construction Co,, 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984)("Where the 
written findings are incomplete, inadequate, or ambiguous,. . . 
they may be elaborated or interpreted (in respects not 
inconsistent therewith) by reference to the trial court's written 
memorandum or its oral explanation of the decision.")(citations 
omitted). Here, defendants' only relevant written finding 
ambiguously states that the human bones and bone fragments "were 
disturbed by defendants" (Id,). Inquiring minds would logically 
next ask how or in what way did defendants "disturb" these bones? 
The unequivocal oral ruling provides the clear answer: defendants 
disturbed the bones by disinterring them (R. 109, 111, 112). 
Defendants' claim that this Court should confine itself to 
the written ruling thus fails on at least two grounds: first, 
rule 52(a) explicitly supports reference to oral findings; and, 
second, the oral findings are not inconsistent with the written 
ruling, but rather serve to clarify incomplete and vaguely-
drafted written findings. To ignore the oral ruling in this case 
would be to strip the appellate process of meaning by ignoring 
the clearly-articulated basis of the fact-finder's decision. 
6 
POINT TWO 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 76-9-
704, "DEAD HUMAN BODY" SHOULD BE 
INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE HUMAN 
REMAINS THAT DEFENDANTS DISINTERRED 
FROM A RECOGNIZED ANASAZI BURIAL 
SITE 
Defendants argue that the term "dead human body" needs no 
definition beyond its commonly understood meaning of a whole 
corpse or complete entity and that, accordingly, the trial court 
correctly determined that the bones in this case did not fall 
within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996).4 To 
illustrate why human bones should not be included within the 
ambit of the broader term "dead human body" for purposes of 
section 76-9-704, defendants rely on U.S. v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 
1413 (10th Cir. 1997). £££ Br. of App. at 7-10. A careful look 
at Shumway, however, reveals that, in fact, its rationale 
supports the State's position. 
Defendant's conviction in Shumway stemmed from his 
4
 Defendants assert that this Court must ignore the 
preliminary hearing court's oral finding of probable cause to 
believe that defendants disinterred human remains. At the same 
time, they argue that the primary legal issue in the case is 
whether the preliminary hearing court correctly found that the 
term "dead human body" did not include the remains unearthed in 
this case. However, if the preliminary hearing court's refusal 
to bind defendants over for trial had been based on a finding of 
no disinterment, as defendants assert, then the definition of 
"dead human body" within the meaning of section 76-9-704 would 
not even be relevant. Ironically, defendants devote much of 
their brief to just this question. See Br. of App. at 6-7, 12-
15. 
7 
unautLoiized excavation of two Anasazi archaeological sites.5 
In one instance, while digging at Dop-Ki Cave in Canyonlands 
National Park, defendant unearthed the skeleton of an infant 
wrapped in a burial blanket. After a jury convicted defendant, 
the trial court imposed sentence, enhancing the base offense 
under the "vulnerable victim" provision of the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, which provided in pertinent part: 
If the defendant knew or should 
have known that a victim of the 
offense was unusually vulnerable 
due to age, physical or mental 
condition, or that a victim was 
otherwise particularly susceptible 
to the criminal conduct, increase 
by 2 levels. 
Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1422 (citing United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 3Al.l(b) (1995)). The question presented on 
appeal was "whether the human skeleton of an Anasazi infant is a 
^vulnerable victim'" within the meaning of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Id. In holding that no dead body could constitute a 
"vulnerable victim," the Tenth Circuit highlighted the 
impracticability in any case of drawing a line between a complete 
human skeleton and less intact remains: if a human skeleton 
qualified as a vulnerable victim, so, too, would "a pile of 
5
 Of relevance here, defendant was charged with violations 
of the federal Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
("A.R.P.A."), a civil regulatory statute comparable to Utah's 
Antiquities Act, and with damaging United States property. 
Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1417 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2, and 18 U.S.C. § 1361). 
8 
cremated remains, or a pile of dirt that was once a pile of 
bones." Id, at 1423. Emphasizing the policy underlying the 
"vulnerable victim" provision — that is, the protection of crime 
victims — the court held that once death occurred, the deceased 
could no longer be characterized as a "vulnerable victim" for 
sentencing enhancement purposes. 
Defendants use the federal court's language to argue that 
the term "dead human body" within the context of section 76-9-704 
must be interpreted to mean only a whole corpse or a complete 
entity because, based on the logic of Shumwav, any line-drawing 
is impractical and will lead to illogical outcomes. See Br. of 
App. at 7-10, 13. 
A close reading of Shumwav, however, reveals that its 
reasoning cannot be superimposed on this case. At the outset, 
while the Tenth Circuit drew a bright line between life and death 
for purposes of the "vulnerable victim" enhancement, the line 
must obviously be drawn sometime after death for a statute aimed 
at abuse or desecration of the dead. Thus, the line-drawing 
problem so neatly resolved in Shumwav cannot be so easily 
resolved in this case. And, to limit the state statute's 
application to conduct committed against complete corpses 
unnecessarily narrows the reach of the statute in light of its 
history and purposes without providing any useful resolution to 
9 
the line-dr&v/jne, quandary recognized in Shumwav.6 
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit left open the possibility of 
applying a sentencing enhancement to a victim who had died if 
that enhancment, unlike the "vulnerable victim" provision, 
focused on the conduct of the offender rather than on the 
characteristics of the victim. Shumwav. 112 F.3d at 1424 (citing 
United States v. Ouintero, 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994) (where 
district court upheld increase in sentence because defendant's 
conduct after child's death constituted "extreme conduct" for 
purposes of relevant sentencing enhancement provision)). The 
Tenth Circuit recogized the importance of analyzing the purpose 
of the enhancement provision in order to determine how it should 
be interpreted. Thus, the Shumway court concluded that its 
"holding here is not intended to limit the application of 
provisions . . . which focus on the offender's conduct." Id. 
Section 76-9-704 plainly focuses on the conduct of the 
offender. Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are phrased in terms of 
a person who "removes," "conceals," "fails to report," 
"destroys," or "disinters." While the object of the criminal 
conduct remains constant throughout, the statute focuses on the 
6
 Defendants' definition of "dead human body" creates 
insurmountable line-drawing problems of its own. For example, 
must the body be covered by flesh to come within the statutory 
definition? Would the intact skeleton that defendant disinterred 
in the Shumwav case qualify? What about a Euroamerican pioneer 
whose remains are unearthed from an isolated and primitive desert 
gravesite? 
10 
variety of unlawful and intentional acts that will classify an 
offender within section 76-9-704. This difference alone, 
according to the Tenth Circuit, can compel a different outcome. 
Further, unlike this case, Shumway involved a sentencing 
enhancement provision that became relevant only after defendant 
was convicted of violating the Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's decision hinged in 
part on the fact that "better means exist to deter the loathsome 
conduct of grave robbers than to drain the term ^vulnerable 
victim' of any reasonable meaning." Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1423 
n.4. 
The statute at issue in this case represents the sort of 
"better means" alluded to by the Tenth Circuit. Section 76-9-
704(1)(a) and (b) were originally enacted to ensure the sanctity 
of the dead by criminalizing the acts of grave robbers who 
disinterred the dead for pecuniary gain. See State's Opening Br. 
at 12-17. From a policy standpoint, it makes good sense to 
charge grave robbers under a criminal statute aimed directly at 
grave robbing rather than to indirectly attack the problem by 
charging them under a purely regulatory statute, such as 
A.R.P.A., and then seeking to enhance their sentences by 
straining the definition of "vulnerable victim." 
Finally, in this case, the definition of "dead human body" 
need not be strained. Defendants assert that a single, narrow 
11 
definition of "dead human body" must apply to the entire statute, 
regardless of its purposes. For this proposition, they argue 
that it is absurd to suggest that, under section (1)(d), one 
could "commit or attempt to commit . . . sexual intercourse" on a 
human remain, as opposed to a complete corpse. See Br. of App. 
at 15-16. Defendants fail to recognize, however, that section 
76-9-704 was enacted piecemeal, with different sections added at 
different times and for different purposes. Section (1)(d), for 
example, was enacted some ninety years after the original 
versions of sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) and for quite different 
reasons. See State's Opening Brief at 15-17. The State's 
broadly-based definition of "dead human body" would honor the 
divergent purposes of section 76-9-704 by encompassing intact 
bodies as well as recognizable human remains. Thus, the behavior 
prohibited by section (1)(d) might involve a substantially intact 
body, while the behavior prohibited by sections (1)(a) and 
(1)(b), the grave-robbing provisions, could involve human 
remains.7 Such an approach would take into account and fulfill 
the disparate purposes of all three sections. 
7
 Contrary to defendants' emotional contention, 
unintentionally disinterring human remains would not subject the 
innocent bean farmer, church-goer, picnicker, or hiker to 
criminal sanctions under section 76-9-704. See Br. of App. at 8-
9. The law unequivocally requires that the conduct be 
intentional. In contrast, one who intentionally or knowingly 
disinterred human remains from an identifiable burial site would 
be culpable. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated both in the State's opening brief ar^ 
in this reply brief, this Court should vacate the order of 
dismissal issued by the preliminary hearing court, reinstate the 
felony information, and order that defendants be bound over to 
district court to stand trial for abuse or desecration of a dead 
human body, a third degree, felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-704. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j|^ day of November, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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